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Josefina Fernandez-Guada~no and Manuel Lopez-Millan
Accounting and Finance Department, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain
ABSTRACT
Employee-owned firms (EOFs) form part of the so-called social
economy, and they are seen as an alternative business model
that aims to establish itself as a third way, different to conven-
tional capitalist firms and public enterprises. These firms meet the
Spanish legal requirements (Law 44/2015) for employee owner-
ship designation. This paper assesses whether the capital owner-
ship structure is a key factor determining operating performance,
productivity and solvency, or in other words, the impact the firm’s
capital ownership structure may have on its economic perform-
ance, labour factor and capital factor. Based on a sample of small
employee-owned firms and non-employee owned firms, the study
develops an empirical methodology using a panel data analysis.
The study shows the characteristics of Spain’s EOFs as an alterna-
tive legal form of employee share ownership, which is included in
the Social Economy, but different from cooperative societies.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 24 January 2018











Employee share ownership is clearly gaining momentum. Indeed, the economic crisis
has increased interest in promoting these employee-owned businesses as a way of striving
for economic democracy and as an alternative to capitalist enterprise, one that looks to
find a balance between labour and capital, to improve economic performance or sectors
of the economy, wage flexibility and wage moderation (Poutsma, Nijs & Poole, 2003).
Employee share ownership takes different forms such as employee share ownership
plans, a typical form that is popular in the U.S.A. although not used much in Europe.
Employee share ownership (ESO) can also be carried out using a savings plan with
contributions from the employee and/or employer, as is most common in the U.K
and Ireland. Further variants include producer co-operatives, in which all the firm’s
shares are collectively owned by its workforce, or employee buy-outs (EBOs), under
which the company’s shares are purchased exclusively by its individual employees
(Poutsma, Nijs & Poole, 2003).
Spain has created an alternative legal form of employee share ownership (Law
44/2015), which is different to cooperative societies and is included in the Law on
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Social Economy (Law 5/2011). In this paper are analysed firms that meet the Spanish
legal requirements for employee ownership designation. According to the regulation
the main characteristic is that more than 51% is owned by its employees. This model,
unique in the European Union (Lejarriaga, 2002), gives us the opportunity to com-
pare it with the conventional capitalist firm.
Financial participation from employees appears to be of particular interest in terms
of public policy for many countries who consider it as a way to improve their busi-
ness performance and therefore their competitiveness (Kato & Morishima, 2003). In
the European Union, growing interest in encouraging employee access to the owner-
ship of the firms in which they work is motivated by extensive evidence on potential
benefits to employees and firms involved in such participation (European
Commission, 2002), as can be seen from the various reports, recommendations and
resolutions dealing with this issue; European policies on this issue are summarised in
the four PEPPER reports (Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and
Enterprise Results).
However, there is still no established European definition of an employee-owned
firm, making it difficult to create a homogeneous regulatory framework and establish
and manage financial support (Fernandez-Guada~no, 2014).
For all these reasons, this paper analyses the extent to which differences in operat-
ing performance, productivity and solvency between employee-owned firms (EOFs)
and non-EOFs can be attributed to their different capital-ownership structures in
order to help strengthen the EOF model.
In Spain, EOFs are part of the Social Economy business model that must show it
is capable of consolidating its position as an alternative to conventional capitalist
companies, demonstrate its viability, and safeguard its added social value (Fernandez-
Guada~no, 2015; Ciruela-Lorenzo et al., 2016; Bel Duran et al., 2018; Bel & Lejarriaga,
2018; Chaves & Monzon, 2018). There are two different types of worker-managed
firms: cooperative firms and employee-owned firms. In both cases the capital is
largely in the hands of the employees, but they are regulated differently. In this paper,
to make the comparison as homogeneous as possible, we have considered the last
new Labour Limited Liability Companies (Law 44/2015) to be employee-owned firms
(EOF) and the Limited Liability Companies (Law 1/2010) to be conventional capitalist
firms (Non-EOF).
EOFs are participation firms in which the specific element that provides people
with the power to establish the firmʼs objectives, or in other words, gives them their
status as partners, is precisely their participation, as players, promoters or actors, in
the production-distribution process of the goods and services. In these companies,
people and their interests in the production and distribution process are a higher pri-
ority than capital (Garcıa-Gutierrez Fernandez, 2002).
According to the Law 44/2015 the primary characteristic of an EOF is that
employees with full-time, open-ended contracts with the firm must own the majority
of the capital. With a minimum of three partners1 required to set up such a com-
pany, the distribution of capital per partner is also regulated in such a way that no
partner can individually own more than one third. Since they have the majority of
the share capital, it is the employee-partners who control the company. And, the final
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requirement is that the number of hours per year worked by the employees with
open-ended contracts who are not partners may not be greater than forty-nine per
cent of the total number of hours worked in the EOF by the employee-partners as a
whole. These requirements must be fulfilled simultaneously if the firm does not wish
to lose its legal status as EOF.
Also, there are legal limits on transferring shares and the difficulties that arise in
these companies when it comes to determining their purchase price (Fernandez-
Guada~no, 2015). To offset this, EOFs have fiscal advantages such as exemptions from
certain taxes but none in terms of tax benefit.
EOFs can be compared with Non-EOFs, in which partner status is achieved by
providing capital, with the final goal being to make a profit. Financial partnership in
this type of company does not imply involvement in other business processes. There
may be some employee ownership but without exceeding 50% of the capital. The
Spanish legal framework allows for different types of non-EOF (Law 1/2010), such as
the public limited company and limited liability company (Fernandez-Guada~no &
Lopez-Millan, 2018). For the purposes of a more homogeneous study, the focus here
is on the second type.
Our interest lies in testing the main hypotheses of traditional economic theory in
relation to the impact of the capital ownership structure of the firm on its economic
performance, labour factor and capital factor. To analyse the differences in the eco-
nomic performance two hypotheses are proposed related to the positively influences
of employee share ownership on value added and return on assets; in the labour fac-
tor the hypothesis establishes related to the productivity variable; and finally, to study
the differences attributed to the capital factor, the hypothesis establishes the positively
influences of employee share ownership on solvency.
As a result, the article is structured as follows: there is an initial description of the
relevant economic literature in this issue, examining the different approaches for and
against employee-owned companies; second, the methodology and statistical models
are presented; in the penultimate section, the empirical results of testing the hypothe-
ses are shown; the last section sets out the conclusions.
2. Literature review
The main differences between the two types of companies are usually attributed to
differences in the objective function, which in turn implies differences in the use and
exploitation of the labour and capital factors (Fernandez-Guada~no, 2015; Melgarejo et
al., 2007a). Analysis of these differences has attested to the idea that ESO is good for
different dimensions of firm performance (Richter & Schrader, 2017) .
Differences in economic performance of the firms are usually attributed to the dif-
ferent capital-ownership structures. The partner-employees in EOFs are, according to
Frohlich et al., (1998) “dual stakeholders”, as both owners and workers, therefore,
economic performance should be better than in conventional firms because they have
more incentives to maximise it. Capitalist partners in non-EOFs receive their divi-
dends for their contributions to capital, which implies an alignment with the profit
maximisation objective attributable to the neoclassical approach and the employees
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receives payments for the work they do in form of wages (Ireland, 1987, Domar,
1966; Craig & Pencavel, 1993; Vanek, 1970).
However, partner-employees in EOFs, by participating in the real, financial and
informational-decisional aspects, may choose to reduce profits, or even do away with
these altogether, anticipating them through labour income, thus affecting the eco-
nomic performance, and, therefore, the return on the capital they provide
(Fernandez-Guada~no, 2015). According to Dow (2018) in a competitive market a
suitably designed Labour Managed Firm (LMF) will maximise profit, to ensure this
outcome one institutional mechanism is a competitive market for LMF membership
rights. Impossible for EOFs with the Spanish regulatory framework. According to
Cahill (2000), many studies find a positive relationship between employee share own-
ership and profitability although, for the most part, this relationship is not statistically
significant. To analyse the differences in the economic performance two hypotheses
are proposed:
H1 Employee share ownership positively influences value added.
H2 Employee share ownership positively influences return on assets (ROA).
In a recent study by Lowitzsch et al., (2017), they consider that employee-owned
firms are likely to have improved labour relations, lower staff turnover and fewer
periods of industrial action. These factors contribute to higher labour productivity.
However, other authors argue that due to the perverse effects of opportunistic behav-
iour, EOFs operate with lower productivity rates for all factors (Alchian & Demsetz,
1972, Williamson, 1975). The comparative productivity of the two types of company
is a widely studied variable but with varying results (Bonin, Jones & Putterman,
1993). To analyse the differences related to the performance of the labour factor, the
following hypothesis is established:
H3 Employee share ownership positively influences productivity
The differences attributed to the capital factor are caused by different aspects of
the financial structure that affect long-term solvency (Fernandez-Guada~no, 2015), and
in particular by lack of motivation in EOFs to increase equity either by attracting
share capital (Alvarez et al., 2000) or retaining profits (Bonin et al., 1993).
In the case of attracting share capital, problems arise due to two fundamental rea-
sons, first, problems with selling the securities which are subject to a series of legal
rules that control their transfer (Law 14/2015, art. 6); second, the difficulties of deter-
mining their purchase price due to the limited access to capital markets. The price
will be that established by mutual agreement between the parties or, in the absence of
this, their fair value. Fair value is understood as that determined by an independent
expert, other than the company’s auditors, appointed by the directors for this purpose
(Law 14/2015, art. 7).
With regard to retaining profits, a number of critics have pointed out that when a
company’s employees can exercise control over the firm’s residuals, they are likely to
influence the distribution of profits so that they receive a larger share, leaving a
smaller share for the retention of profits and consequently for investment (Lowitzsch
et al., 2017). According to Jensen & Meckling (1979) EOFs tend to under-invest
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retained earnings because members who plan to leave the firm cannot capitalise on
subsequent investment returns. This makes it unattractive for members to sacrifice
wages for the sake of internal capital accumulation (the ‘horizon problem’)
(Dow, 2001).
The problem of under-investment is frequently addressed by rules specifying a
minimum rate of reinvestment out of collective capital (Dow, 2018). This rule is
imposed by Law (art. 14) in the Spanish case which also establishes that in addition
to the legal reserves and those required by the articles of association, EOFs are
obliged to create a special reserve to which ten per cent of the net profit in each
financial year must be allocated until it reaches a figure of at least more than twice
the share capital.
To study the differences attributed to the capital factor, the following hypothesis is
established:
H4 Employee share ownership positively influences solvency.
The issue of differences between the two types of firms remains controversial.
Perhaps the mixed evidence in the literature review could be due to the diversity of
employee-ownership forms or according to Richter & Schrader (2017) the extant
empirical research suggests that investigations of the ESO-firm performance relation-
ship are sensitive to the model specification and the use of alternative performance
measures. This paper aims to find additional empirical evidence from Spain, the only
country in the European Union that has regulated the social economic model repre-
sented by the EOF.
3. Methodology
To test the four previous hypotheses and analyse the causes behind the differences we
encountered, we use a panel data methodology. Specifically, the model used was as
follows: Q¼bXit þ (aiþmit). Where Q denotes a measure of the firmʼs performance,
for Q we consider four measures: Model 1: Value added; Model 2: ROA; Model 3:
Productivity and Model 4: Solvency. For Xit, we consider ownership and the control
variables size, sector, age and indebtedness.
We estimated our models by using feasible generalised least square robust random
effects estimation procedure. This study is interested in the performance differences
between EOF and non-EOF that can be attributed to the differences in capital owner-
ship. According to Hsiao (2003) this between-firm variance can be best analysed
using a random effects model. If we see our data we can appreciate more variation
across individual firms (between-variation) than over time (within-variation). The
Hausman test confirms our data inspection la Prob> chi2 is greater than .05 and the
null hypothesis is rejected because there is no correlation between the individual
effects and the explanatory variables and the random model is chosen. The Wald test
for heteroskedasticity gave positive results, therefore, feasible generalised least squares
(FGLS) regression that controls for heteroscedasticity was necessary for robust-
ness reasons.
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4. Empirical data and analysis
4.1. Data
To obtain the samples of the two types of company, we selected from the Orbis data-
base those Spanish companies active during the 2009–2012 period, omitting those
that did not provide financial data in any of the years being studied. On classifying
them by size, it was noted that there were no medium or large EOFs in the sample,
so the non-EOFs of these sizes were eliminated. Finally, we checked that non-EOFs
were not “de facto” EOFs. Therefore, the final sample includes 727 firms consisting
of 384 non-EOFs (52.8%) and 343 EOFs (47.2%).
The sample firms have been classified by activity sector (Table 1), size (Table 2)
and also on the basis of their age (Table 3). All of them are considered control varia-
bles in the statistical study.
The companies in the sample belong to the secondary (industry and construction),
and tertiary (services and commerce) sectors in accordance with the National
Classification of Economic Activities2. There are higher percentages of both types of
company in the tertiary sector than the secondary sector. Nevertheless, the sample of
EOFs contains more secondary sector firms than that of non-EOFs.
Subsequently, the companies were classified by their average size in terms of num-
ber of employees, following European Commission (concerning the definition of
micro and small enterprises, Official Journal L 124 of 20.5.2003). The highest percent-
age of non-EOFs and EOFs fall to micro-companies followed by small firms. The
sample of EOFs contains more micro firms than that of non-EOFs
Lastly, the distribution of the sample in accordance with age (Table 3) shows that
almost half of the non-EOFs were created in the decade 1990–2000 and the other
half (45.8%) after the year 2000, while 76.1% of the EOFs were created in 2000 or
later. This is probably due to government efforts to encourage employee-participation
firms, through subsidies and policies such as total capitalisation of unemployment
benefit, which has been enhanced over recent years.
4.2. Variables
4.2.1. The dependent variables
According to Melgarejo, Arcelus & Simon (2007b) and Fernandez-Guada~no (2015),
the variables used to measure operating performance must include indicators of
financial performance, profitability, financial structure, wage remuneration
and solvency.
To test the hypotheses related to the economic performance (H1 and H2), the vari-
ables chosen were value added and the return on assets. Both measures are
Table 1. Distribution of sample firms by sector of activity.
Sector
Non-EOF EOF Total
N Per cent N Per cent N Per cent
Secondary 99 25.8 143 41.7 242 33.3
Tertiary 285 74.2 200 58.3 485 66.7
Total 384 100.0 343 100.0 727 100.0
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commonly used to analyse the effects of employee ownership on performance
(Richter & Schrader, 2017; Defourney et al., 1985).
To test Hypothesis 3 on the use of the labour factor, the most widely-used variable
in the majority of the earlier studies is labour productivity, defined as the contribu-
tion of the workers to the obtaining of the final operating result. Finally, for
Hypothesis 4, the capital factor, the measure used was long-term solvency.
All of these measures are accounting data which are widely used by managers, ana-
lysts and researchers because “they reflect a return more directly under the control of
management and the workforce” (Richter & Schrader, 2017:.5).
4.2.2. Explanatory variables
The main variable representing employee share ownership takes the value 0 if it is
non-EOF and 1 if it is EOF. Also included are control variables that have been shown
to be significant in previous studies (Melgarejo, Arcelus & Simon, 2007b; Melgarejo,
Arcelus & Simon, 2014; Espinosa Mendez, 2009; Wang, 2009), size, age and indebted-
ness measured in logarithm3. Furthermore, we included a dummy variable for sector
of economic activity and also for each year a dichotomous variable which reflects the
accumulated time effect for all the companies compared with the start of the period.
(See Table 4)
The descriptive statistics indicate (Table 5) that, on the one hand, non-EOFs on
average have a greater age, size, VA and solvency ratio, and on the other hand, EOFs
on average have a greater ROA, debt coefficient and productivity.
If we analyse the correlation coefficients between the variables in Table 6, we can
see that there is a significant positive correlation between the age and size with VA. In
turn, VA is significantly negatively correlated with the variable that translates indebted-
ness and positively correlated with the ROA, solvency and productivity variables. In
turn, indebtedness is significantly negatively correlated with the return on assets and
financial solvency4. Last, ROA is significantly positively correlated with solvency.
We have also developed an exploratory analysis testing average differences between
the two types of company. To do so, we have applied non parametrical tests
Table 2. Distribution of sample firms by size.
Non-EOF EOF Total
N Per cent N Per cent N Per cent
Micro (0–9 employees) 319 83.1 320 93.3 639 87.9
Small (10–49 employees) 65 16.9 23 6.7 88 12.1
Total 384 100.0 343 100.0 727 100.0
Table 3. Distribution of sample firms according to their age.
Non-EOF EOF Total
N Per cent N Per cent N Per cent
Before 1990 19 4.9 1 0.3 20 2.8
1990–2000 189 49.2 81 23.6 270 37.1
After 2000 176 45.8 261 76.1 437 60.1
Total 384 100.0 343 100.0 727 100.0
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(U-Mann and Kruskal-Wallis). It can be seen, in Table 7, that there are significant
differences in the value added, productivity and solvency due to type of company.
4.3. Empirical data and analysis
The companies being compared ‘have different capital-ownership structures and this
could lead to differences in economic performance, which in turn could have an
impact on the way they exploit the labour and capital factors of productionʼ
(Fernandez-Guada~no, 2014). To test the differences, we develop an explanatory ana-
lysis and create four models. Results of the random effects regressions are presented
in Table 8.
All models have a good fit as demonstrated by high Wald chi values. The results
of Model 1 show (Table 8) that four variables, size, indebtedness, sector and capital
ownership (which differentiate the EOFs and the non-EOFs) are significant in
explaining value added. These results show that the different capital ownership struc-
ture does exert a significant influence on value added. This is a negative effect, or in
other words, the fact that a company is an EOF decreases the value added. The size
and age effect are also significant and positive, and in this case the larger the size and
the age of a company the greater the value added. Debt has a significant negative
effect, which means that the greater the financial risk the lower the value added. The
temporary effect has been included, measured by the year variable. It can be seen
that its influence is significant and increasingly negative, which can be attributed to
the effects of the economic crisis.
The results of Model 2 show, in Table 8, that the capital and debt ownership struc-
ture, as measured by the debt coefficient, has a significant negative effect on ROA
and that the temporary effect variable (year) reflects a significant and negative vari-
ation in 2019 and 2012 as a consequence of the deterioration of the economic cycle.
It can be seen that capital ownership (which differentiates the EOFs and the non-
EOFs), in Model 3, does not significantly influence productivity. Indebtedness is sig-
nificant in explaining productivity. With regard to the time effects, a significant drop
is only observed in 2011 compared with the initial reference year.
As can be seen in Model 4, different types of firm, EOF or non-EOF, do not sig-
nificantly influence solvency, and neither do any of the control variables, except size
Table 4. Summary of the study variables.
Abbreviation of variable Variables
VA Log value added (Financial year resultþ Corporation taxþ Personnel
expensesþDepreciation chargesþ Financial expenses and similar)
ROA Log return on assets (EBIT/Total assets)
Productivity Log productivity variable (value added / personnel costs)
Solvency Log solvency (Equity /Total liabilities)
PROP Type of firm, dichotomous variable: EOF ¼ 1 Non-EOF ¼ 0
Size Log Number of employees
Sector Sector of economic activity Secondary ¼ 0 Tertiary ¼ 1
Age Log number of years in operation
Indebtedness Log debt coefficient.
Year 2010 Time effects. Dichotomous variable: year 2010¼ 1 ; other year ¼ 0
Year 2011 Time effects. Dichotomous variable: year 2011¼ 1 ; other year¼ 0
Year 2012 Time effects. Dichotomous variable: year 201 2¼ 1 ; other year ¼ 0
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that has a positive influence. The negative and significant time effect took place
in 2012.
5. Results and discussion
5.1. Differences in economic performance
EOFs do not enhance company performance, all other factors remaining constant.
The EOFs do not enjoy an advantage in economic performance for either measures
considered in this study: VA and ROA. The results demonstrate that the capital own-
ership structure that differentiates the EOFs from the non-EOFs influences value
added and ROA negatively, which is in contrast to the results found in some previous
empirical studies (O’Boyle et al., 2016; Melgarejo, Arcelus & Simon, 2007b, Kruse &
Blasi, 1995). In this study the value added variable has been used precisely to avoid
the differences in economic performance attributed to these different types of firms
that can be seen when comparing the profit for the financial year variable. Value
added is an indicator of the operational or economic activity of the firm which does
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for the sample.
Non-EOF EOF Total
N Mean Std. Dev N Mean Std. Dev N Mean Std. Dev
Age 384 12.00 6.00 343 8.00 3.00 727 10.00 5.00
ROA 384 5.9984 36.97 343 5.35 21.44 727 5.69 30.62
Indebtedness 384 81.63 67.69 343 85.49 57.58 727 83.45 63.11
Size 384 6.00 8.00 343 4.00 4.00 727 5.00 7.00
VA 384 189.95 266.10 343 111.18 150.28 727 152.79 222.58
Solvency Ratio 384 18.37 67.69 343 14.51 57.58 727 16.55 63.11
Productivity 384 0.83 8.51 343 1.02 0.79 727 0.92 6.21
Table 6. Correlation analysis.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Age 1
2 Size .105 1
3 VA .134 .753 1
4 Indebtedness .068 .066 .175 1
5 ROA .037 .037 .163 .502 1
6 Solvency .068 .066 .175 1.000 .502 1
7 Productivity .019 .009 .080 .016 .058 .016 1
N¼ 727Significance levels: 1%Significant at 5%.
Table 7. Average differences in tests.
Prop
Value added ROA Productivity Solvency ratio
U Mann-Whitney 53393.5 61522.5 60272.5 60290
W Wilcoxon 112389.5 120518.5 119268.5 119286
Z 4.409 1.533 1.975 1.969
Asymptotic sig. (bilateral) .000 0.125 0.048 0.049
a Grouping variable: prop
Significant at 5%.
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not take into account personnel costs that, in the case of EOFs, can skew results due
to their dual partner-employee status (Fernandez-Guada~no & Lopez-Millan, 2018).
These results may be due to a variety of reasons which have been addressed in the lit-
erature and which recognise that higher levels of ESO, as occurs in the case of
Spanish EOFs, may induce inefficiencies that limit its positive effects on company
performance or even reduce them as they may bear the costs of collective decision-
making (Richter & Schrader, 2017) or may also weaken the incentives for outside
monitoring and control such as economic surplus for non-employee shareholders
(Jensen & Meckling, 1979). Some analyses even suggest that “workers may be rela-
tively risk-averse leading to limited reinvestment, low capital-labour ratios and poor
economic performance” (Defourney et al., 1985: 200).
Furthermore, according to Kim & Patel (2017) and Caramelli & Briole (2007), dif-
ferences in institutional context across countries could explain variations in the influ-
ence of employee ownership on performance.
In terms of previous findings, Kruse & Blasi (1995) concluded that the key find-
ings that emerge from performance studies are that there is no automatic connection
between employee ownership and firm productivity or profitability. The empirical
evidence remains mixed.
5.2. Differences in productivity
These results are consistent with some previous findings (Fernandez-Guada~no, 2014;
Richter & Schrader, 2017), but not with the most widespread theoretical ideas in the
literature which consider that this is the variable that determines the main differences
Table 8. Results of random effects regressions.
Model 1: VA Model 2: ROA Model 3: Productivity Model 4: Solvency
Prop .075 .004 .001 .005
(.015) (.005) (.003) (.008)
Size .221 .003 .008 .011
(.012) (.003) (.002) (.004)
Sector .034 .0002 .001 .001
(.016) (.004) (.002) (.008)
Age .049 .006 .003 .007
(.018) (.005) (.002) (.009)
Debt .051 .034 .001
(.010) (.012) (.002)
Year
2010 .011 .003 .006 .000
(.005) (.002) (.004) (.002)
2011 .014 .007 .001 .002
(.006) (.002) (.005) (.002)
2012 .027 .022 .008 .023
(.011) (.009) (.007) (.011)
Cons 5.975 6.10 5.10 6.27
Wald chi2 523.62 26.68 29.62 26.87
N. obs 2908 2908 2908 2908
N. firms 727 727 727 727
Significance levels:p< 0.1;p< 0.05;p< 0.01 T Based on robust standard errors, in parenthesis.
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between the two types of firm. This is due to the dual status of the partner-employee
which makes employees more involved in the firm and this in turn is supposed to
result in improved productivity, competitiveness and job quality. Thus, according to
various reports from the (European Commission 2002, Fajardo-Garcıa et al., 2016),
employee owned firms are characterised by generating more stable links between the
employee and the firm, by reducing employee turnover and by increasing job stability
and motivation. This study does not allow us to verify these effects (see Table 8).
5.3. Differences in solvency
The results show that the different capital ownership structure, which differentiates
the EOF from the non-EOF, does not explain the differences in solvency that have
been found between the two types of firms (see Tables 7 and 8).
These results support theorists predicting a lack of motivation in EOFs to finance
capital using their own funds (horizon problem) due to the dual role of partner and
employee in the same person (Fernandez-Guada~no, 2015). EOFs may have problems
in accumulating capital above all if we take into account the legal restrictions (Law
44/2015) on increasing own funds such as limitations on attracting the capital of cap-
italist partners; limitations on the free trading of securities; a lack of an organised
market; and greater profit retentions than for non-EOFs, with the obligation to create
a special reserve which may only be used to offset losses and/or for the acquisition of
own shares. These restrictions imposed by Spanish legislation may have contributed
to the worse results of the EOFs both in terms of solvency and in terms of profitabil-
ity. According to Dow (2018) a market for EOF membership would have eliminated
the horizon problem. But this is difficult in the Spanish case.
6. Conclusions
The intention of this research is to support the Spanish model represented by EOFs
as a tool for the promotion of employee ownership and participation. The Spanish
EOF is a Social Economy business model characterised by employees holding the
majority of the three types of flow in any business: information and decision-making
flows, financial flows and production flows. The regulation of this Spanish model,
unique in the European Union, gives us our comparison with conventional capitalist
firms. Therefore, these are special firms that meet the Spanish legal requirements for
employee ownership designation. According to Lowitzsch et al., (2017) EOFs in Spain
are based on employee ownership whose demonstrated benefits complement the pol-
icy aims of Active Labour Market Policies. They found that could easily be employed
in the other 27 EU Member States as a best practice model because there are no legal
obstacles to the adoption of this concept across the EU.
There are several different Community initiatives promoting financial participation of
employees in their firms’ capital as a way to improve the firm’s performance and thus
make it more competitive. For this reason, this paper analyses the extent to which differ-
ences in VA, ROA, productivity and solvency between employee-owned firms (EOFs)
and non-EOFs can be attributed to their different capital-ownership structures.
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As a result, four models were proposed using these variables, which are considered
in the economic literature to give rise to the main differences attributed to the differ-
ent capital ownership structures, adding size, age, sector and indebtedness as control
variables. The difference in the capital ownership structure between the two types of
firms has allowed to explain the value added (Model 1) and ROA (Model 2) but has
not been a determining factor in explaining productivity (Model 3) and financial
solvency (Model 4). The results of Model 1 show that value added is influenced by
the different capital ownership structure, by size and by indebtedness. If we consider
that as a measure of performance the variable VA neutralises the effects of a possible
anticipation of profits, which is a policy very frequently used in employee-owned
firms to avoid the double taxation of profits, then the negative relationship between
this and the EOFs shows that employee share ownership does not contribute to the
better economic performance noted in previous studies. Admittedly there is no unan-
imity in the scientific community about its effects, but this result highlights the fact
that during this period of crisis, EOFs in Spain have responded worse to the shock
than non-EOFs. We agree with some authors that not only the economic but also the
institutional context, such as the strict regulatory framework, may have restricted the
performance of the EOFs. Productivity, despite having a higher value on average in
the EOFs than in the non-EOFs and the fact that this difference is significant, but is
not influenced by the different ownership structure of the firms being compared, as
shown by the results of Model 3. The results, in Model 4, show that the different cap-
ital ownership structure does not explain the differences in solvency, despite constant
concern in the economic literature about the low provision for the reserves in EOFs
which leads to low solvency values.
This study serves to add a further conflicting result to the literature on employee
ownership and company performance.
Future analysis could be enriched if additional explanatory variables were intro-
duced in the models and also by increasing the number of years and including a new
period that is not affected by the economic crisis whose negative effects have been
demonstrated in this study. Moreover, unlike non-EOFs, EOFs also need to be ana-
lysed by looking at other social indicators to adequately assess their performance.
There is a growing view that financial performance measures per se are inadequate
for strategic decision making. Qualitative data could add value by providing new
insights. Caution is required in the interpretation of these results because two limita-
tions should be considered, on the one hand, the coarse measure of employee owner-
ship, on the other hand, the results can only be applied to firms that are structured
similar to that provided by the Spanish law or those of similar type in
other countries.
In terms of policy implications, measures should be considered such as fiscal
incentives to make it easier for workers to access the property and retain earnings to
finance future investments. In order to enhance the performance of EOFs, the gov-
ernment could implement a number of measures such as modifying the limits
imposed with regard to the hiring of workers who are not partners and permitting a
more flexible use of the special reserve, both of which can could affect business per-
formance without the company losing its legal status or its special protection.
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Notes
1. There are also exceptions to these requirements such as the chance to set up employee-
owned firms with two partners, as long as both are employees and they hold equal shares
in the company.
2. National Classification of Economic Activities assigns a code to each economic activity.
Generally this code (which is usually five digits) is used in many forms both official and
at company level. Available in: https://www.cnae.com.es/index.php. The primary sector
has not been considered due to the small number of observations
3. All the variables that give negative results have been transformed to be able to calculate
the logarithm by adding their minimum value.
4. Note that Model 4 (dependent variable Solvency) does not include the independent
variable Debt.
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